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 FIDELITY TO OUR IMPERFECT 
CONSTITUTION:  
A RESPONSE TO SIX VIEWS 
 
FIDELITY TO OUR IMPERFECT CONSTITUTION. By 
James E. Fleming.1 New York: Oxford University Press. 
2015. Pp. xv + 243. $75.00 (cloth). 
James E. Fleming2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
I am deeply grateful to Constitutional Commentary for 
publishing this symposium on my recent book, Fidelity to Our 
Imperfect Constitution: For Moral Readings and Against 
Originalisms. In the book, I put forward a sustained critique of 
originalism—whether old or new, concrete or abstract, living or 
dead. Instead, I defend what Ronald Dworkin called a “moral 
reading” of the U.S. Constitution3 and what Sotirios A. Barber 
and I have called a “philosophic approach” to constitutional 
interpretation.4 By “moral reading” and “philosophic approach,” 
I refer to conceptions of the Constitution as embodying abstract 
moral and political principles—not codifying concrete historical 
rules or practices—and of interpretation of those principles as 
requiring normative judgments about how they are best 
understood—not merely historical research to discover relatively 
specific original meanings. Through examining the spectacular 
 
 1. Professor of Law and The Honorable Frank R. Kenison Distinguished Scholar in 
Law, Boston University School of Law. 
 2. I wish to thank Imer Flores for organizing a conference on the penultimate draft 
of my book at the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM) on February 16-
17, 2015. Most of the papers included in this symposium were originally prepared for that 
conference. 
 3. RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 2-3 (1996). 
 4. SOTIRIOS A. BARBER & JAMES E. FLEMING, CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION: THE BASIC QUESTIONS xii, 155–70 (2007). 
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concessions that originalists have made to their critics, I show the 
extent to which even they acknowledge the need to make 
normative judgments in constitutional interpretation. I argue that 
fidelity in interpreting the Constitution as written requires a 
moral reading or philosophic approach, not any version of 
originalism or living constitutionalism. Fidelity commits us to 
honoring our aspirational principles, not following the relatively 
specific original meanings (or original expected applications) of 
the founders. Originalists would enshrine an imperfect 
Constitution that does not deserve our fidelity. Only a moral 
reading or philosophic approach, which aspires to interpret our 
imperfect Constitution so as to make it the best it can be, gives us 
hope of interpreting it in a manner that may deserve our fidelity 
(pp. xi, 3). 
All but one of the essays included here were originally 
drafted for a wonderful symposium Imer Flores organized on the 
penultimate draft of the book at the National Autonomous 
University of Mexico (UNAM). I benefitted greatly from the 
commentaries there by Sotirios A. Barber, Imer Flores, Ken I. 
Kersch, Linda C. McClain, and Larry Sager (all of which are 
published here in revised form), as well as those by Richard Fallon 
and Larry Solum. I revised the book significantly based on 
criticisms Fallon and Solum made in draft papers and remarks at 
the UNAM conference that are not published here. Fallon’s paper 
made clear how important it was for me to stress that my 
conception of fidelity in constitutional interpretation is not 
theological or religious in the way that Jack Balkin’s conceptions 
of constitutional faith, fidelity, and redemption seem to be.5 His 
paper was so cogent that I completely accepted his criticisms and 
accordingly revised the book throughout. Therefore, having 
concluded that his essay had accomplished its constructive 
purpose, he quite sensibly decided not to publish it. Solum’s 
remarks prompted me to clarify that in my book I am addressing 
his programmatic account of “the new originalism” as a family of 
theories in his book, Constitutional Originalism. I am not 
addressing his own theory of originalism, which he has been 
developing in a number of works, published and unpublished, 
over the years. I understand, from conversations with Solum, that 
 
 5. Richard Fallon, The Rhetoric of Constitutional Theology, draft prepared for the 
conference on the penultimate draft of this book, held at the National Autonomous 
University of Mexico. 
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he plans to elaborate his own theory of originalism in three books 
to be published over a number of years. I also thank Robert W. 
Bennett for contributing a review to this symposium. I shall take 
up the essays in alphabetical order. 
II. BARBER: RESPONDING TO THE “PERSISTENT 
RESURGENCE OF ORIGINALISM” 
In 2007, Barber and I published a book, Constitutional 
Interpretation: The Basic Questions, in which we took up 
Dworkin’s famous call for a “fusion of constitutional law and 
moral theory,” arguing for a philosophic approach to 
constitutional interpretation.6 In doing so, we systematically 
analyzed competing approaches—textualism, consensualism, 
originalism, structuralism, doctrinalism, minimalism, and 
pragmatism—that aim and claim to avoid making moral and 
philosophic judgments about the best understanding of the 
Constitution. We argued for a “fusion of approaches”: “Within 
such a fusion, we . . . understand text, consensus, intentions, 
structures, and doctrines not as alternatives to but as sites of 
philosophic reflection and choice about the best interpretation 
and construction of our constitutional commitments.”7 
This book is a sequel or companion to Barber’s and my prior 
book. In this book, I criticize particular originalisms in a more 
thoroughgoing way and demonstrate the concessions many 
originalists have made to the moral reading or philosophic 
approach. Furthermore, I elaborate the place and constructive 
uses of original meaning, precedent, and tradition in a philosophic 
approach. I also recast leading conceptions of living 
constitutionalism as moral readings that strive to be faithful to the 
best understanding of the Constitution. I engage especially with 
new varieties of originalism and living constitutionalism that have 
emerged more fully since that prior book was completed (pp. xi-
xii). 
Barber says that, since 2007, he has excused himself from the 
debate with “the so-called new originalisms” until now “because 
[he] thought that there was little to be said about constitutional 
interpretation that hasn’t been said” and because he thought “one 
and only one approach” to constitutional interpretation “makes 
 
 6. BARBER & FLEMING, supra note 4, at xiii. 
 7. Id. at 190. 
9 - FLEMING.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/2/16 10:49 AM 
492 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 31:489 
 
sense,” namely, the approach Dworkin, Barber, and I have 
defended.8 Even if Barber is right that there was “little to be said 
. . . that hasn’t been said,” I think it may be worthwhile to repeat 
(and, where necessary, reformulate) what we said before in order 
to rebut the new originalisms that have sprung from the hydra 
head of originalism. Indeed, since 2007, many people have 
claimed to be saying something new in defense of new 
originalisms. I have been invited to a number of conferences 
assessing these new originalisms. Instead of sitting on the sidelines 
and simply saying, “read Barber’s and my 2007 book, 
Constitutional Interpretation: The Basic Questions,” I have 
thought it important to participate in these debates with the new 
originalists, reformulating our arguments in defense of a 
philosophic approach and criticizing their new formulations. 
Barber acknowledges that “there are questions to ask about 
the persistent recurrence of originalism.”9 He also observes that I 
“revisit[] the interpretative debate to save new originalists from 
themselves.”10 Indeed I do. I believe there is value in showing the 
extent to which many of the new originalists acknowledge the 
need to make moral judgments in constitutional interpretation, 
even as they claim to be rejecting moral readings. 
Barber further states: “What I fail to understand is Jim’s 
optimism about the future of constitutional theory in the face of 
the cultural and intellectual barriers to the one mode of 
interpretation that makes sense.”11 He also has reservations about 
my optimism in the face of political dysfunction and looming 
constitutional failure.12 Admittedly, my disposition may seem 
more optimistic than Barber’s, but my views on failure and fidelity 
may not be as far from his analysis as he suggests. As Barber 
notes, I acknowledge that “a clear form of failure would be a 
people’s loss of the capacity to change or reform a constitution.”13 
And I recognize that the Constitution may have contributed to 
our present dysfunction through its failure adequately to sponsor 
a formative project of cultivating the civic virtues and the 
capacities needed to maintain constitutional self-government. 
 
 8. Sotirios A. Barber, On Jim Fleming’s Anti-Originalism, 31 CONST. COMMENT. 
389, 389 (2016). 
 9. Id. at 391. 
 10. Id. at 389. 
 11. Id. at 394. 
 12. Id. at 395–96. 
 13. Id. at 395. 
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Indeed, I suggest that our best hope for averting constitutional 
failure may be, not to rewrite the Constitution, but to rewrite the 
constitutional culture through reinvigorating such a formative 
project (pp. 170, 184, 187). And so, I agree with Barber that 
“constitutional fidelity rests on hopes for cultural change.”14 The 
only place where I disagree with him is that he believes this 
“would fall short of a real argument for constitutional fidelity,”15 
whereas I think it stems from an argument for constitutional 
fidelity—if we understand fidelity as honoring our aspirational 
principles, not merely following our historical practices (pp. 20, 
105-06, 173-38, 189, 191). I start from where we are: as citizens 
working within our constitutional practice, adopting an attitude of 
fidelity toward the Constitution despite its imperfections, trying 
to interpret it so as to honor its commitments and make it the best 
it can be. 
III. BENNETT: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION, NOT 
THEORY OF THE FUNCTION OF COURTS 
If Barber views my book from the perspective of a long-time 
co-author who is close to the project, Bennett views it from a 
standpoint completely outside the project.16 I wrote a book 
engaging in debates between originalisms and moral readings, 
including some versions of living constitutionalism. In 2011, 
Bennett co-authored a book with Solum, participating in a 
parallel debate between originalisms and living 
constitutionalisms.17 As such, I would have expected Bennett to 
assess my criticisms of originalisms. I also would have expected 
him to assess my account of moral readings and my recasting of 
certain versions of living constitutionalism as moral readings. He 
does neither. 
Instead, he takes me to task for having written a work in 
constitutional theory that ignores a traditional conception of the 
function of courts as being to resolve disputes. To be sure, there 
are longstanding and important debates between two competing 
conceptions of the function of courts: to resolve disputes or to 
 
 14. Id.  
 15. Id.  
 16. Robert William Bennett, The Document and the Drama, 31 CONST. COMMENT. 
397 (2016). 
 17. ROBERT W. BENNETT & LAWRENCE B. SOLUM, CONSTITUTIONAL 
ORIGINALISM: A DEBATE (2011). 
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express values.18 But I did not enter into those debates. 
Furthermore, I do not think that those debates map onto the 
debates I did take up, between originalisms and moral readings. 
Perhaps Bennett is assuming that a moral reading necessarily falls 
on the expressing values side of those debates, and necessarily 
rejects the resolving disputes conception. That is not necessarily 
the case. In my book, I am writing theory of the Constitution—
what the Constitution is, how to interpret it, whether there is a 
difference between interpretation and construction, what might 
constitute constitutional failure, whether we should amend the 
Constitution or indeed adopt a new one—not offering a view of 
judicial power or the function of courts. 
Moreover, my account of a moral reading is not court-
centered. It recognizes that constitutional interpretation occurs 
both inside and outside the courts—not only by legislatures and 
executives but also by social movements and citizens generally. 
Constitutional interpretation in this “protestant” sense (pp. 89, 
131-132) is not limited to a dispute resolution model. Our practice 
of constitutional interpretation is broader than courts resolving 
disputes. In terms of Bennett’s formulation, it is a much larger 
“drama” than that of courts narrowly deciding the cases before 
them.19 And so, our constitutional theories—whether originalist, 
living constitutionalist, moral reading, or eclectic—are also 
broader than that. 
IV. FLORES: THE BEST UNDERSTANDING OF 
FIDELITY 
Imer Flores’s thoughtful essay—through addressing the basic 
question I raised, Who is to interpret the Constitution?—
recognizes the breadth of a moral reading of the Constitution as 
contrasted with a dispute resolution model of courts narrowly 
deciding the cases before them.20 Every author must hope for 
readers as careful and sympathetic as Flores. His interpretive 
charity and generosity of spirit in engaging with my book recall 
 
 18. Some of the classic works in this debate included: Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and 
Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353 (1978); Abram Chayes, The Role of the 
Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976); Owen Fiss, Foreword: The 
Forms of Justice 93 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1979).  
 19. Bennett, supra note 16, at 390, 403. 
 20. Imer B. Flores, Intelligent or Unintelligent Fidelity?, 31 CONST. COMMENT. 407 
(2016). 
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for me the warm hospitality with which he hosted the symposium 
on the penultimate draft of it at UNAM. His essay prompts me to 
acknowledge two significant points. 
First, Flores’s observations in his opening comments at the 
UNAM symposium led me to make subtle and nuanced revisions 
throughout the book, especially with respect to my rhetorical 
strategies of pitting moral readings against originalisms. Flipping 
the originalists’ rhetorical strategy of asking, “Are we all 
originalists now?,” I had examined the spectacular concessions 
that originalists have made to their critics and asked, “Are we all 
moral readers now?” Flores’s remarks prompted me to recast my 
argument to say—whether or not we are all moral readers now, 
which might mistakenly imply that we all have systematic, 
coherent moral readings—we all (including originalists) now 
acknowledge the need to make normative judgments in 
constitutional interpretation (pp. 3, 126). 
Second, reading Flores’s sympathetic explication of 
Dworkin’s moral reading as well as my own recalls for me the 
excitement I experienced when I originally read Dworkin’s 
Taking Rights Seriously upon its publication in 1977. Although 
other readers may have been most moved by the passages about 
“taking rights seriously,” I was captivated by the power of 
Dworkin’s rhetorical strategy of seeking to reclaim the virtue of 
fidelity in constitutional interpretation from “the jurisprudence of 
Richard Nixon,” a form of proto-originalism manifested in the 
constitutional views of Nixon’s first nominee to the Supreme 
Court, Justice William Rehnquist.21 The passages Imer quotes 
from Taking Rights Seriously concerning fidelity were the 
inspiration for my co-organizing a major symposium on “fidelity 
in constitutional interpretation” for Fordham Law Review 
featuring Dworkin as the keynote speaker.22 Those passages and 
the conference itself in turn were the inspiration for my writing 
the book, Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution. Flores shows 
more fully than I did in my book that the aspiration to fidelity was 
there from the beginning in Dworkin’s work. Flores also 
instructively invokes the work of Lon Fuller distinguishing 
 
 21. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 131–49 (1977).  
 22. See Symposium on Fidelity in Constitutional Theory, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1249 
(1997), in particular, Ronald Dworkin, The Arduous Virtue of Fidelity: Originalism, Scalia, 
Tribe, and Nerve, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1249 (1997).  
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between “intelligent” and “unintelligent” fidelity.23 Whether or 
not Fuller’s ideas on “positivism and fidelity to law” and “the 
morality of law”24 influenced Dworkin’s initial formulations, they 
certainly were an important antecedent for them. Flores is right 
to bring Fuller’s ideas to bear on the arguments for moral readings 
and against originalisms. 
V. KERSCH: “CALL[ING] THE FIGHT” FOR MORAL 
READINGS OVER ORIGINALISMS 
Ken Kersch is an astute intellectual historian of American 
political and constitutional development. Accordingly, I am 
gratified that he concludes that “Fleming’s important new book 
breaks new ground in its prominent attempt at synthesis” between 
the “aspirationalism” of moral readings and the “historicism” of 
originalisms, and that it is a “thoughtful, timely, and engaging 
contribution to understanding the way we live now in the United 
States, and in U.S. constitutional theory.”25 Relatedly, since many 
critics seem to assume that moral readings are inherently utopian 
and not adequately grounded in our constitutional practice, I am 
delighted that he views my book as an advance that, through 
reckoning more fully with “fit” with historical materials, has made 
a moral reading more cogent—that I have made a “laudable 
attempt to walk [my]self back” from liberal constitutional theory 
that has been “very far out on that plank.”26 
Kersch criticizes me, though, for striving to “call the fight”27 
for aspirationalism over historicism. I need to draw a distinction 
here. I did not mean to “call the fight” for aspirationalism over 
historicism, but I confess that I did indeed mean to argue for the 
superiority of moral readings over originalisms. To explain the 
distinction: I argued that in our constitutional culture, the use of 
history—what Kersch calls “historicism”—is not originalist (pp. 
136-140). Here I took a page out of Jack Balkin’s extraordinarily 
rich analysis of the uses of history in our constitutional practice: 
 
 23. Flores, supra note 20, at 421–22 (quoting and discussing Lon L. Fuller, The Case 
of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 HARV. L. REV. 616, 625–26 (1949)).  
 24. See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (rev. ed. 1969); Lon L. Fuller, 
Positivism and Fidelity to Law—A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630 (1958).  
 25. Ken I. Kersch, Originalism’s Curiously Triumphant Death: The Interpenetration 
of Aspirationalism and Historicism in U.S. Constitutional Development, 31 CONST. 
COMMENT. 423, 434 (2016).  
 26. Id. at 432. 
 27. Id. at 425, 439. 
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that it does not function as originalists, old and new, assume or 
claim it does. To the contrary, he offered a typology of eleven 
“styles of justification,” many of which use history in weaving 
aspirationalism together with historicism.28 I also contended that 
a moral reading could and should incorporate such uses of 
history—in fitting and justifying our constitutional practice. This 
is the concern for “fit” or “historicism” in my moral reading or 
“aspirationalism” that Kersch applauds. 
Again, I acknowledge that I did try to “call the fight” for 
moral readings over originalisms. I argue that moral readings are 
more faithful to our Constitution and our constitutional practice 
than originalisms. Moreover, I contend that many “new 
originalisms” are best understood as moral readings. But I was not 
thereby trying to “call the fight” for aspirationalism over 
historicism.29 Instead, I was presenting a philosophic approach as 
a “fusion of approaches” that incorporates its “historicism” into 
its “aspirationalism” by reckoning seriously with “fit” with 
historical materials in a moral reading (pp. 33, 106-108, 136-140). 
And I was arguing in favor of moral readings’ conception of 
fidelity as honoring our aspirational principles, over and against 
originalist conceptions of it as following our historical practices 
(pp. 20, 105-106, 137-138, 189, 191). Perhaps my way of framing 
the debates and my arguments was more polemical than 
necessary, as in the subtitle of my book, “for moral readings and 
against originalisms” (p. iii). 
Finally, Kersch relates my book to the Rawlsian and 
Dworkinian projects in constitutional theory to which I have 
contributed in previous books.30 He characterizes my project as 
“mopping up” and trying to show that my concern for fidelity, fit, 
and justification was there in Rawls and Dworkin “all along.”31 
Although, as just noted, Flores’s essay explicates some of the 
antecedents in Dworkin’s work for the moral reading I develop in 
my book, my project is not to “mop up” or to attribute my concern 
for fidelity to Rawls and Dworkin. My work is, indeed, broadly 
speaking, Rawlsian and Dworkinian. But my aim is not to put 
 
 28. Jack M. Balkin, The New Originalism and the Uses of History, 82 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 641, 659–60 (2013). 
 29. Kersch, supra note 25, at 424. 
 30. See, e.g., JAMES E. FLEMING, SECURING CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY: THE 
CASE OF AUTONOMY (2006); JAMES E. FLEMING & LINDA C. MCCLAIN, ORDERED 
LIBERTY: RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND VIRTUES (2013). 
 31. Kersch, supra note 25, at 425. 
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forward an exegesis of Rawls’s or Dworkin’s work. Instead, I have 
developed a philosophic approach inspired by, and in the spirit of, 
the general frameworks of Rawls and Dworkin. I ask the reader 
to assess my arguments on their own terms—and in terms of 
whether I offer a recognizable and attractive account of our 
constitutional practice—not in terms of whether I have been true 
to Rawls or Dworkin’s work or whether I have tidily “mopped 
up” after them. 
VI. MCCLAIN: MORAL READINGS VERSUS 
ORIGINALISMS IN OBERGEFELL: THE “EMPTY 
CUPBOARD” OF CONVENTIONAL ORIGINALISMS 
I appreciate Linda McClain’s careful analysis of originalisms 
versus moral readings in Obergefell v. Hodges (along with the 
decision it overruled, DeBoer v. Snyder), the recent Supreme 
Court decision recognizing that the fundamental right to marry 
extends to gays and lesbians.32 Her paper richly substantiates two 
claims I made in my book. First, that the new originalists who 
argue that cases like Obergefell are not “anti-originalist” but 
indeed are compatible with originalism—the “inclusive 
originalists”—are engaging in moral readings and are trying to rid 
their originalisms of the baggage of Justice Antonin Scalia’s and 
Judge Robert Bork’s exclusive originalisms. Second, that the 
exclusive originalists are not going to be persuaded by these new 
“inclusive originalist” arguments (pp. 16-19). 
Three things that come out in McClain’s analysis are telling. 
First, when some new, inclusive originalist scholars filed an 
amicus brief in Obergefell making “abstract originalist” 
arguments for extending the fundamental right to marry to gays 
and lesbians, other (more conventional) exclusive originalist 
scholars filed an amicus brief counter-arguing that this abstract 
originalism is more in line with Dworkin’s anti-originalist moral 
reading than with a true originalism.33 Second, neither of the 
originalist judges on the Supreme Court—Justice Scalia and 
Justice Thomas—was moved one inch by these inclusive 
originalist arguments, nor were Chief Justice Roberts and Justice 
 
 32. Linda C. McClain, Reading DeBoer and Obergefell through the “Moral Readings 
versus Originalisms” Debate: From Constitutional “Empty Cupboards” to Evolving 
Understanding, 31 CONST. COMMENT. 441 (2016) (analyzing Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. 
Ct. 2584 (2015), and DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F. 3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014)). 
 33. McClain, supra note 32, at 460–66. 
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Alito.34 Third, the majority opinion, by Justice Kennedy, was not 
moved in the slightest by these arguments and was not at all 
originalist in any conventional sense. Instead, his opinion 
exemplifies a moral reading.35 To be sure, history matters in 
Kennedy’s opinion. But the history that matters is history as 
evolving contemporary consensus moving away from the history 
that the originalists say is relevant, that of the relatively specific 
original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868. That is, 
the history that matters is that of evolving contemporary 
consensus working toward better understandings of our 
constitutional commitments—not history of the founding as an 
authoritative source that decides our questions for us (or that we 
must follow).36 
McClain’s analysis makes all of these points as plain as day. 
Originalism in any conventional sense remains, as Justice 
Ginsburg put it, “an empty cupboard”37 as far as sex equality and 
equality for gays and lesbians are concerned. The most jaw-
dropping statement I have ever read in constitutional theory is 
William Baude’s “inclusive originalist” suggestion to the contrary 
that “Obergefell seemed to pick the originalist route.”38 This 
confirms my analysis in the book that his inclusive originalism 
includes practically everything that a moral reader would be likely 
to argue for in our constitutional culture (pp. 1, 15-19). 
VII. SAGER: “FIDELITY TO THE BEST VERSION OF 
OURSELVES” 
I am delighted that Sager’s essay is “in the nature of a 
concurring opinion.”39 For I view Sager, along with Barber, as the 
leading proponents of a moral reading, philosophic approach, or 
justice-seeking account working in constitutional theory today. In 
my development of the moral reading, I simply adopted Sager’s 
highly instructive account of the thinness or moral shortfall of 
constitutional law as compared with our thicker conceptions of 
constitutional justice and of justice generally. I also developed a 
 
 34. Id. at 464–64. 
 35. Id. at 466–67. 
 36. Id. at 466–73. 
 37. Id. at 446 (quoting Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sexual Equality Under the Fourteenth 
and Equal Rights Amendments, 1979 WASH. U. L. Q. 161, 164). 
 38. William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2349, 2382 (2015). 
 39. Lawrence Sager, Fidelity to the Best Version of Ourselves, 31 CONST. COMMENT. 
479 (2016). 
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form of what he has called a “justice-seeking” constitutional 
theory: in which courts, legislatures, executives, social 
movements, and citizens generally are partners in building out our 
constitutional practice to honor the best understanding of our 
constitutional commitments (pp. 89-90). 
Sager’s opening formulation about the relationship between 
the text of the Constitution and our constitutional practice is 
exactly right: “[T]he text is in service of our practice; our practice 
is not in service of the text . . . at least not until we arrive at the 
conclusion that our practice is best served by an understanding 
that connects us to the text in this dominating way.”40 That is a 
characteristically incisive formulation that hones in on what is 
wrong with many varieties of originalism: they fail to understand 
the purpose of our constitutional practice. Sager seems to be 
worried that I may not give sufficient weight to precedent in our 
constitutional practice.41 I was walking a tightrope between 
viewing precedent as an obligation (responding to Abner 
Greene’s criticism) and viewing it as a factor or resource to be 
taken into account in constructing the best interpretation of our 
constitutional commitments (incorporating Balkin’s account) (pp. 
102-105). I may have slipped on that tightrope and he may be right 
that a moral reading should give precedent more weight than my 
account did. 
But Sager and I may not be as far apart as it might look. After 
all, I did contend, in the spirit of Sager, that proponents of 
common-law constitutional interpretation typically give greater 
weight to precedent than originalists do (pp. 103-104). And I did 
present my moral reading as a form of such common-law 
constitutional interpretation (pp. 108-115). I suppose two things 
may account for the rhetorical distance between Sager and me 
with respect to precedent. One, perhaps my intense engagement 
with originalists—and argument that moral readers are more 
faithful to the text than are originalists—led me to emphasize text 
more than he does. Two, although I fully recognize and insist that 
we build out our constitutional practice over time, making 
judgments expressed through precedents, I was not putting 
forward a theory of precedent as such and therefore I did not 
advance the usual justifications for following precedent (including 
 
 40. Id. at 479. 
 41. Id. at 487. 
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those typically associated with common-law constitutional 
interpretation). That may make it sound like I am giving less 
weight to precedent than do some proponents of common-law 
constitutional interpretation. Yet I view precedent as an 
instantiation or approximation of the best understanding of our 
justice-seeking Constitution (pp. 102-105). With that observation, 
I hope to narrow the gap between Sager’s and my accounts. 
Sager also expresses reservations with respect to my 
aspiration to fidelity to our imperfect Constitution. As he sees it, 
there is a “misalign[ment]” between my aspirationalism and my 
commitment to fidelity.42 Perhaps there are affinities between 
Sager’s and Barber’s skepticisms about my aspiration to fidelity 
as compared with aspirations to seek justice. But my aim was to 
reclaim the aspiration to fidelity from the originalists, 
reconceiving it as honoring our aspirational principles, not simply 
following our historical practices. I believe that there should be 
enough justice-seeking contained in that conception of fidelity to 
satisfy Sager. He encapsulates this conception well when he 
suggests that mine is an aspiration to “fidelity to the best version 
of ourselves.”43 To my mind, that seems to be a justice-seeking 
account of our constitutional practice. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
In the title of his essay, Kersch cleverly speaks of 
originalism’s “curiously triumphant death.”44 I chuckled when I 
read that phrase. In this vein, I open my book by contending that 
originalists make spectacular concessions to their critics and then 
declare victory over them (p. 1). As originalist Keith Whittington 
has acknowledged, originalism is like a character in a Night of the 
Living Dead movie. Just when you think it is dead, it proves to be 
alive.45 I have no illusions that I have vanquished the hydra head 
of originalism, but I hope to have brought out some of the ways in 
which many originalists now acknowledge the need to make 
normative judgments in constitutional interpretation. And I hope 
to have made some progress in recasting and reclaiming the 
aspiration to fidelity to our imperfect Constitution. 
 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 479, 487. 
 44. Kersch, supra note 25, at 423. 
 45. Keith E. Whittington, It’s Alive! The Persistence of the Constitution, 11 THE 
GOOD SOC’Y 8–12 (2002). 
